

More on Secularization, Thoughts on Sex, and the Authority of the State[#]

Mais sobre Secularização, Pensamentos sobre Sexo e à Autoridade do Estado

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VARIETIES OF SECULARIZATION RECONSIDERED

God is no longer worshipped publicly. Sin has become a nearly obsolete word. Even sex has changed. Sex no longer has moral significance. Having sex has become like playing tennis: one just needs a consenting partner if one is not playing solitaire. A whole domain of human life has been deflated in its significance. How is one to understand these vast recent transformations of Western culture? How is one to judge secularization and its consequences, especially given the demoralization and deflation of morality? The removal of God from the public square by taking away any point of ultimate orientation has brought across the radical force and meaning of secularization. The place in which we find bioethics is new. So, too, is the meaning of health care policy. This not only changes the significance of sex, and therefore the bioethics of such issues as the artificial insemination of unmarried women, as well as of abortion, but it also brings the legitimacy of the state into question, along with the standing of healthcare policy.

At the outset, one must acknowledge that secularism, secularism, and secularization are multivalent and ambiguous. For example, the secularity of the minimal state outlined in *The Foundations of Bioethics* (Engelhardt 1986, 1996) is not the secularity of contemporary secular fundamentalist states. The English term secular derives from the Latin *saeculum*, which itself has a range

of meanings. Lewis and Short give the following definitions of the Latin:

The body of individuals born at a particular time, generation; a generation within a single family; (pl.) the succession of generations; 2. a breed, race; 3. the present time, the contemporary generation, the age; 4. the period of a time corresponding to the lifetime of a particular person or persons, age; 5. a human lifetime, generation; 6. 1 period of one hundred years, a century; 7. one of the imaginary divisions or ages (golden, silver, etc.) of human history; 8. (pl.) future ages, posterity; 9. (pl.) through the ages, for ever; the course of human affairs; 10. human life, the world [Lewis & Short 1879, pp. 1613–1614].

The word *saeculum* is rich in meaning. For example, *saeculare* also refers to a hymn, the *carmen saeculare*, that Horace composed at the command of Augustus Caesar and that was first sung in A.U.C. 737 (i.e., 17 B.C.). A *saeculum* marked a period of about 100 to 120 years and had a sense of *sacramentum* and *sacerdotum* (Mommensen 1858, esp. pp. 168–189). The word was once heard in Roman Catholic churches throughout the world in the refrain, “per omnia saecula saeculorum”, “through ages of ages”.

The English terms secular and secularization also compass a complex variety of meanings. These include (1) the religiously neutral context of ordinary life that a monk renounces so as through asceticism to pursue

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the Kingdom of Heaven (*saeculo renunciare*), (2) a cleric or the property of a cleric who has not taken special “religious” vows (e.g., poverty, chastity, and obedience), (3) the process of rendering a religious cleric and/or his property into being secular (e.g., freeing the cleric from those vows), (4) the process that renders a cleric or church property into a layman or a layman’s property, (5) the attempt to annul or limit the powers, immunities, and influence of the church, (6) secularism as a movement or ideology aimed at removing religious discourse and presence from the public forum and/or the public space, and (7) secularization as the process by which the dominant culture is cleansed of any reference to God and religion. The minimal state, as for example in the account of Robert Nozick (1938–2002), is secular in the first sense (Nozick 1971). However, there is on the face of the earth no minimal state. The sixth sense is exemplified in the movement, secularism, founded by George Holyoake (1817–1906) (Goss 1908; Holyoake 1896, 1871). The laicism that structures current secular fundamentalist states draws on both the sixth and the seventh senses (Engelhardt 1991, pp. 22–23; 2010a, 2010d). These senses of secular and secularism identify a laicism that gained salience after the French Revolution and that now frames the now-dominant secular culture.

The secular character of the culture now dominant in Western Europe and the Americas is more radical than Charles Taylor appreciates (Taylor 2007). First, contemporary secularity is nested within a robust and aggressive laicism. It is not just that, in the now-dominant culture, belief in God has become optional^a, which involves secularity in the first sense, or that concern for God and the transcendent have weakened, but that reference to God and the transcendent have with prejudice been removed from public spaces^b, involving secularization in the sixth and seventh senses. It is rather that this secularization is occurring in a very aggressive fashion,

such that the now-dominant culture has made public confession of belief in God highly politically incorrect. As David Hollinger observes, in America by the 1960s, “Religion was increasingly private, and public discussion was increasingly secular” (Hollinger 1996, p. 28). Among other things, in America’s elite colleges and universities, “the open profession of Christian belief in the course of one’s professional work is uniquely discouraged” (Hollinger 1996, p. 28). As Michael McConnell puts it, “in most of academia, and in many walks of life dominated by the secular elite, the news of the death of God has been taken to heart and the voice of religion is all but silenced” (McConnell 1993, p. 166). This provides a strong instance of the sixth and the seventh senses of secularization. Religious faith is something one should not have, or at least have privately and then only with embarrassment, and about which one should not speak in public. The contemporary dominant secular culture creates a pervasive sentiment against any speech or behavior that suggests belief in God and against believers who confess their belief in the public space. Belief in God is something about which one should even feel ashamed. The secularization of the public forum and public space, as well as of the dominant culture, excludes not just religious acknowledgements of God and of the importance of worshipping God, but it even excludes public philosophical, non-religious reflections on whether one needs to acknowledge God in order to make sense of morality and reality. One is not even to ask whether the idea of God is essential to traditional notions of morality and bioethics.

There is a resolute animus against any public consideration of God or of the transcendent, because many now regard even a philosophical consideration of God as a prelude to religious violence, in particular the violence of believers against non-believers. As Santiago Zabala puts it, “Thought must abandon all objective, universal,

a. Charles Taylor notes that one dimension of the secularization of the dominant culture of the West involves “a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace” (Taylor 2007, p. 3). To put the matter more strongly, in many circles belief in God has become a social embarrassment and its expression a faux pas.

b. Taylor also observes a change in the character of public spaces, which is associated with secularization. “One understanding of secularity then is in terms of public spaces. These have been allegedly emptied of God, or of any reference to ultimate reality” (Taylor 2007, p. 2). They have at least been deChristianized, whether or not one credits Thomas Luckmann’s qualifications regarding a residual religion (Luckmann 1990).

and apodictic foundational claims in order to prevent Christianity, allied with metaphysics in the search for first principles, from making room for violence” (Zabala 2005, p. 13). Such secularists hold themselves justified in mounting a pre-emptive strike against what they perceive to be the dangers of even the most abstract theological reflection, though in the 20th century more were killed by atheist governments than have ever been killed by religious fanaticism. These secularists have embraced a strong sense of *laïcité* so that religious beliefs or even natural theological reflections have come to be regarded as superstitions that constitute threats to civic peace, which threats must be contained if they cannot be eradicated. The dominant secular culture has even produced a proselytizing atheist movement (Dawkins 2006, Harris 2005). Religion, in particular Christianity, threatens the re-moralization of morality and bioethics.

It is not simply, as Max Weber (1864–1920) puts it, that there has been a disenchantment (*Entzauberung*) of reality so that mysticism and the presence of spirits are neither acknowledged nor appreciated^c. Most particularly, the cosmic struggle between good and evil as spiritual and personal is not to be mentioned in public by those who still recognize it. An *Entzauberung* has surely occurred. One might consider Duffy’s description of the life of Christianity in England before the Reformation to appreciate a non-disenchanted life-world.

Mass began with an elaborate procession round the church, at the commencement of which salt and water were solemnly exorcised, blessed, and mixed. In the course of the procession the altars of the church, and the congregation, were sprinkled with holy water, which would later be taken to the households of the parish, where it was used to banish devils and ensure blessing (Duffy 1992, p. 124).

With a few emendations, this picture of pre-Reformation England is still true of the life of an Orthodox church in 21st century America, where holy water is blessed to be taken home, where oil is sanctified for anointing at home^d, where the priest is invited at least yearly to bless each home, and where the Our Father concludes with “and deliver us from the evil one.” Fully “enchanted” Christian life-worlds still exist, alive with the recognition of devils and angels. It is not just that the dominant culture has lost an appreciation of the cosmic dimension of the struggle between good and evil, but that any hint of a recognition in the public space by believers of this struggle is actively to be suppressed. The cultural space in which morality and bioethics are articulated is fully after God.

Harvey Cox (1929–) in *The Secular City* regards secularization as integral to “the liberation of man from religious and metaphysical tutelage, the turning of his attention away from other worlds and toward this one” (Cox 1966, p. 15). The rupture has been so radical that the Roman Catholic dissident theologian Edward Schillebeeckx (1914–2009) stated:

The Christian revelation, in the form in which it has been handed down to us, clearly no longer provides any valid answer to the questions about God asked by the majority of people today. Neither would it appear to make any contribution to modern man’s meaningful understanding of himself in this world and in human history. It is at once evident that more and more of these people are becoming increasingly displeased and dissatisfied with the traditional Christian answers to their questions (Schillebeeckx 1969, p. 156).

Although he in important ways revised his earlier views, Peter Berger in 1969, in the midst of the cultural

c. Max Weber affirms the *Entzauberung der Welt* by which the recognition of divine and angelic powers is exorcised. “That great historic process in the development of religions, the elimination of magic from the world which had begun with the old Hebrew prophets and, in conjunction with Hellenistic scientific thought, had repudiated all magical means to salvation as superstition and sin...” (Weber 2001, p 61).

d. Orthodox Christianity has maintained the ancient practice of persons taking blessed oil home to anoint themselves and their family members. Statkus reports that this custom was even recognized in the West in the first centuries. “In the early centuries Pope Innocent I (401–417) and other early writers seemed to give evidence in their writing to the ministry of sacred oil by lay people. According to these writings it seems to have been an accepted custom for lay people to anoint not only others but also themselves” (Statkus 1951, pp. 25–26).

Kilker’s criticism of this view is not convincing (Kilker 1926, p. 82).

and sexual revolution that produced the contemporary dominant secular culture, observed:

Probably for the first time in history, the religious legitimations of the world have lost their plausibility not only for a few intellectuals and other marginal individuals, but for broad masses of entire societies. This opened up an acute crisis not only for the nomination of the large social institutions but for that of individual biographies. In other words, there has arisen a problem of “meaningfulness” not only for such institutions as the state or the economy but for the ordinary routines of everyday life (Berger 1969, p. 130).

However, Islam appears as a counter-example to Cox’s assertion that “urbanization means a structure of common life in which the diversity and the disintegration of tradition are paramount” (Cox 1966, p. 4). Within Muslim countries, desecularization, not secularization, has occurred despite urbanization, a phenomenon to which we will turn in the next chapter. Moreover, many such as the Hassidic Jews have learned how to live in the secular city without themselves being secularized (Fader 2009).

Berger’s characterization identifies a radical change in the possibilities for meaning in the once-Christian West, whose dominant culture is now secular. This change was quite apparent after the First World War, as the commitments of the dominant intellectual class became increasingly post-Christian. As a result, there was a subtle but significant shift that secularized the mainline Christianities themselves and the character of the public culture, so that a secular view was favored over a religious. In 1939, on the brink of the Second World War and the armed conflict among the secularized polities of Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States, T. S. Eliot writes:

We must remember also that the choice between Christianity and secularism is not simply presented to the innocent mind, *anima simplicetia*, as to an impartial judge capable of choosing the best when the causes have both been fully pleaded. The whole tendency of education (in the widest sense—the in-

fluences playing on the common mind in the forms of “enlightenment”) has been for a very long time to form minds more and more adapted to secularism, less and less equipped to apprehend the doctrine of revelation and its consequences. Even in works of Christian apologetic, the assumption is sometimes that of the secular mind (Eliot 1982, p. 190).

By the late 1960s and 1970s, the secular transformation of the public culture was pervasive (Bloom 1992; Cox 1966; Hutchison 1989). Given America’s dominantly Protestant character, as Harold Bloom observes, “the American Religion, which is so prevalent among us, masks itself as Protestant Christianity yet has ceased to be Christian” (Bloom 1992, p. 32). This secularization has been wide-ranging because it was tied to the demoralization and deflation of morality that would bring bioethics into question and lead to the delegitimization of the state that would bring the force of healthcare policy into question.

The agenda of the dominant secular culture has been in particular to deprive religion of any political significance. Religion is not to be a political project. Only secular, democratic constitutionalism is to have legitimacy. In many cases, the secular and anti-religious project goes beyond that of Rawls’ notion of public reason in which public discourse is to be sustained independently of “comprehensive doctrines of any kind” (Rawls 1999, p. 143). As, for example, in the case of András Sajó, as Lorenzo Zucca points out, Sajó “genuinely believes that secular public reason is our common comprehensive doctrine at the foundation of Western political systems” (Zucca 2009, p. 507). This aspiration to an official secular discourse for the public forum and the public space surely begs the question as to which discourse should be normative.

The trouble is that secular reason, as a comprehensive doctrine, is not shared by everyone in our societies, as there are other competing comprehensive doctrines, mainly religious ones. How does one find a compromise between religious and nonreligious comprehensive views without appealing to secular reason? That is the question that preoccupies Rawls,

though it does not seem to preoccupy Sajó in the least. This explains why Sajó does not hesitate to call religious arguments a burden on secular people. But the problem is that our societies impose secular burdens on religious people without paying the slightest attention to religious arguments. Hence, Sajó's suggestion to exclude religious arguments totally has an authoritarian ring (Zucca 2009, p. 507).

Nevertheless, the secular agenda is to mount a project of cleansing religion from the public space.

This cleansing of religion from the public space is to be undertaken in part by directly forbidding as far as possible religiously grounded public speech, especially that with a political focus. This is also to be undertaken indirectly through undermining the religious significance and identity of religious institutions in the public space. "Secularism in constitutional law means that social functions of 'churches' are taken over by the state or are privatized. This is the result, at least partly, of the changed self-perception of mainstream churches" (Sajó 2008, p. 609). This occurs by, for example, removing Roman Catholicism from involvement in adoption by requiring the placing of adoptees with homosexual couples. The agenda of removing any strong presence of religion from public services is shaped by the secular requirement of keeping "religion out of the public sphere.... Religion cannot be a political project" (Sajó 2008, p. 621). This secularizing project requires progressively limiting religious freedom and strong religious expression in the public square when it has political implications. This goal is often pursued by constraining religious institutions so that they can no longer publicly proclaim the presence of God but are instead left affirming "values", which are compatible with the social-democratic project.

This volume explores these vast changes in the dominant culture of the West that have driven and are driving its further secularization, recasting the context for understanding contemporary morality and bioethics. These changes are tied to the end of Christendom, as well as to the marginalization of Christianity. In addition, many of the mainline Christianities of the West have rendered

themselves post-traditional. These changes are complex and have many intertwining sources. Procrusteanly, they can be gathered under eight headings.

The Enlightenment's pursuit of emancipation has been associated with an antipathy not just to the clergy, but to Christianity generally. In its turn away from the past, the Enlightenment supported a search for emancipation from Europe's past, namely, Christendom, and a liberation from the constraining hand of tradition. This search for emancipation was expressed in the Enlightenment's fascination with autonomy, which gained further salience in the 20th century (Schneewind 1998). Being a Christian became suspect because of Christianity's particular non-philosophical, non-universalist core acknowledgement of a Messiah Who is God, Who was born in a particular place with a particular genealogy. This particularity collided with the Enlightenment's claims regarding universal rights, such as those around which the European Union has sought to articulate its identity, morality, and bioethics.

The Enlightenment's view of persons as first and foremost members of a universal moral community. This account encourages regarding moral agents as individuals apart from sex, race, family, history, nationality, and particular community. The universal moral community is to bind persons simply as moral agents. This leads not just to discounting the significance of intermediate institutions so that there is nothing separating the individual and the state, but also to considering persons as bare individuals making fully plausible, *inter alia*, the self-assignment of sexual identity. Individuals are to find their primary moral orientation in terms of universal allegiances as humans *qua* persons, not as Christians or Jews, or members of families, citizens of nations, or as men and women. They are to be citizens of the world apart from any particularity.

The Enlightenment's endorsement of equality has led to the pursuit of fair equality of opportunity, for all persons are to be fully interchangeable, thus bringing both the family and religious communities into question. There is a particular animus against the family because families invest their energies primarily in raising

their own children, rather than the children of others. So, too, religious communities as particular communities give psychological support and identity first and foremost to their own members.

The Enlightenment's endorsement of the pursuit of happiness has become the pure pursuit of pleasure or bare preference satisfaction, so that happiness has been shorn of any particular normative content. Moved by a universalist and morally vacuous solidarity, persons are not just to be guaranteed that amount of food, clothing, and shelter needed for survival, but to be given the opportunity for that amount of food, clothing, shelter, and resources needed to feel satisfied. This commitment to satisfaction has led to the emergence of the hook-up culture, as well as to an affirmation of soft if not hard pornography. Traditional Christian culture is thus undermined by seduction.

The Enlightenment rejected a traditional theistic view of the transcendent in part because it divides. Traditional Christianity is regarded as a particular threat to the possibility of a full identification with a universal moral communality. The current dominant culture requires all normative concerns to be articulated and understood within the horizon of the finite and the immanent, so that a concern for a transcendent orientation will not fragment the secular community.

In order to pursue emancipation, respect the bare individual, achieve fair equality of opportunity, pursue happiness as pleasure, and locate all meaning within the horizon of the finite and the immanent, the now-dominant culture requires that religion, especially Christianity, to be tolerated in the public space, only if its meaning is subject to a full secular translation so as to be given an immanent meaning as a mere element of culture. Once translated into secular terms, religion can be allowed to serve as a moral heuristic, following Jürgen Habermas, or can be recognized as an enrichment of culture, as a *Kulturgut*, becoming a detheologized ritual, among other things. Differences are to be set aside through homogenizing interreligious and intercultural dialogue. The goal is to banish attempts to convert the

other through characterizing proselytizing as violence against the other.

The rapidity of these changes in Western Europe and the Americas during the 1960s was driven by the significant chaos engendered in Western Christianity during and following Vatican II, which changes accelerated the decline of the mainline Christianities of the West. The moral vacuum that resulted enabled the European Union to embrace an ethos of transformative secularization, with aggressively post-Christian characteristics. A similar process is taking place in the Americas and elsewhere. These changes recast the background assumptions or paradigm framing bioethics, a point to which we will turn in greater detail in Chapter Seven.

Morality and bioethics, as a consequence, have been subjected to a demoralization and deflation because of their full severance from a God's-eye perspective. This robust secularization is more forceful and transformative than most have acknowledged.

This volume explores these intertwining roots of the contemporary, dominant, secular culture and of its character of being after God, which determines the situation within which contemporary bioethics must be understood.

A NEW SENSE OF TOLERATION: TOLERATION AS ACCEPTANCE

With wide-ranging implications, as the previous chapter shows, secular morality is increasingly recognized to be without foundations. Because of the acknowledgement of the absence of metaphysical roots, of foundations, all morality and bioethics, which have been regarded as justified through moral-philosophical argument, is demoralized and deflated. The bioethics of the artificial insemination of unmarried women, abortion, physician-assisted suicide, and euthanasia becomes a bioethics of life- and death-style choices. When all is approached as if everything ultimately came from nowhere, went to nowhere, and for no ultimate purpose, Protagoras is vindicated: there is no vantage point beyond the sphere of the socio-historically conditioned.

Each person becomes the measure and standard of all things^e. As has already been shown, morality becomes a macro life-style choice. As Santiago Zabala in his essay, “A Religion Without Theists or Atheists”, recognizes, these changes in how reality and morality are appreciated are tied to the character of contemporary secularization.

It is indeed secularization that teaches us that questions about the nature of God are useless because of the weakness of our reason. We are not told that God does not exist, only that it is not clear what it actually means to affirm or deny his existence. Postmodern man, who has lived out the end of the great unifying syntheses produced by traditional metaphysical thought, manages to live without neurosis in a world where God is no longer present, therefore in a world where there are no longer stable and guaranteed structures capable of supplying a unique, ultimate, and normative foundation for our knowledge and for our ethics (Zabala 2005, p. 11).

All is rendered contingent and therefore in the end unstable and without ultimate meaning. “All that is solid melts into air” (Berman 1982). The loss of ultimate meaning is to be accepted with equanimity.

Given the loss of moral objectivity, given the demoralization and deflation of morality and bioethics, the secular culture forbids a condemnatory moral attitude regarding peaceable life-style and death-style choices (e.g., engaging in homosexual acts, reproducing outside of marriage, or using physician-assisted suicide). In addition, the central importance within the dominant secular culture of respect of persons is taken to require that one respect persons in their life- and death-style choices, however perverse and misguided these choices may be. That is, it is judged to be immoral to judge peaceable life- and death-style choices to be immoral, because one is required to respect persons in the choices that they are free to make within secular polities. Although in the face of intractable moral pluralism, one can no longer discern the immorality of particular life-

and death-style choices, the hope is still to discern the canonical character of the higher-level moral obligation to be non-judgmental. Of course, this is impossible, for morality and bioethics themselves have become a macro life-style choice.

The prohibition of being judgmental has thus become core to the new secular ethos and its life-world. One is not to speak judgmentally about what secular bioethics allows (e.g., one is not to say “abortion is immoral and a sin”). Charles Murray notes in his account of the increase of out-of-wedlock births in the United States primarily among lower socio-economic classes that the upper socio-economic whites who have far fewer illegitimate births are nevertheless disinclined to make adverse moral judgments regarding the life-style choices that lead to births outside of marriage, even if such births are associated with generally negative social outcomes for both the women and the children.

Nonjudgmentalism is one of the more baffling features of the new-upper-class culture. The members of the new upper class are industrious to the point of obsession, but there are no derogatory labels for those who are not industrious. The young women of the new upper class hardly ever have babies out of wedlock, but it is impermissible to use a derogatory label for non-marital births. You will probably raise a few eyebrows even if you use a derogatory label for criminals. When you get down to it, it is not acceptable in the new upper class to use derogatory labels for anyone, with three exceptions: people with differing political views, fundamentalist Christians, and rural working-class whites (Murray 2012, pp. 289–290).

The dominant secular culture’s demoralization of major dimensions of traditional morality is accompanied by a commitment not to tolerate the intolerant, not to tolerate those who fail to be non-judgmental with regard to legal life- and death-style choices. Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) finally triumphs (Wolff et al. 1965). The

e. Protagoras recognized that without a point of ultimate reference “Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not” (Diogenes Laertius 2000, Protagoras IX.51, pp. 463, 465).

phrase “no tolerance for the intolerant” serves as a rallying cry for secularists in the culture wars against any who would remoralize what in the dominant culture have become life-style and death-style choices. Christian bakers, for example, who refuse to make wedding cakes for homosexuals are visited with opprobria such as “bigot”. A powerful wall of aversive emotions is recruited against “fundamentalists” who seek to re-anchor morality in the will of God. Tolerance has become a code word for the culturally required demoralization of a wide range of sexual, reproductive, and end-of-life choices. The new secular, demoralized, and deflated culture requires that one be adversely judgmental regarding those who are judgmental^f. The result has been a foundational recasting of the meaning of toleration.

The English word toleration has roots in the Latin *tolerans*, which like the original English indicates enduring, suffering, or putting up with something about which one disapproves. One finds this meaning of tolerance in the English Act of Toleration (24 May 1689), which under certain conditions allowed freedom of worship to particular non-conformists, but not to Roman Catholics and Unitarians. Moreover, despite the Act of Toleration, only Anglicans could sit in Parliament, although specified non-conformists were free to have their own churches for their own worship. It was clear that those who were tolerated had not through this toleration received approval of their religion or of their form of worship. They were members of communities often publicly despised. They were members of religious communities holding dogmas that were recognized by the state as wrongheaded and heretical, but nevertheless as tolerable. Again, traditionally one tolerates only that of which one does not approve. In this sense, certain heretical religious bodies and their members were tolerated, and coercive force was not used against them, although they and their members were still subject to social pressure because they were understood as worshipping

and believing wrongly (Sowerby 2013). John Locke’s *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689), which is generally regarded as a defense of the English Act of Toleration, excludes atheists from toleration. “Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the Being of a God” (Locke 1983, p. 51). Toleration grew in its scope, as the state attempted to come to terms with intractable religious pluralism. As Hegel appreciated, this created a space for the emergence of the open space of contemporary civil society, along with the eventual secularization of that society and the state^g.

The recent recasting of the meaning of toleration requires not just that one forbear from using force against those whom one tolerates, but that one in addition indirectly affirm the views that are tolerated. This transformed meaning of toleration socially prohibits one from stating publicly that, although one has taken the position that persons holding particular disapproved-of views and/or engaging in particular disapproved-of actions (e.g., fornication, adultery, homosexuals acts, false worship, particular doctrines) should be free of state coercion, they nevertheless act immorally. That is, one is to be prohibited from saying, “you should be free to practice your religion, but it is an evil heresy;” “you should not be jailed for your life-style; however, it is perverse and immoral;” “physicians who are willing should not be legally forbidden to artificially inseminate unmarried women, but it is sinful.” Persons with wrongheaded views or those who engage in perverse or immoral actions are not to experience the discomfort of adverse publicly-voiced adverse moral judgments. Instead, the dominant secular culture requires an indirect affirmation of the life-style choices of others through phrases such as: “Different people have different life-styles; your life-style is simply not right for me, although it is good for you.” The result is that the dominant secular culture affirmatively requires that bioethics make space for a wide range of life-style and death-style choices, of which sexual and

f. For a critical assessment of being intolerant of the “intolerant” see Carson 2013.

g. Hegel appreciated that the intractable pluralism created by the Reformation helped secularize society through enhancing the state. “Consequently, far from it being, or ever having been, a misfortune for the state if the Church is divided, it is *through this division alone* that the state has been able to fulfil its destiny as self-conscious rationality and ethical life” (Hegel 1991, §270, p. 302). See, also, Gregory 2012.

reproductive choices (e.g., the artificial insemination of lesbians) are among the most salient about which no bioethical criticism is to be allowed. Such tolerance is integral to a particular, although dominant, macro life-style choice, a “morality” that requires an at least weak acceptance of that which is tolerated.

SEX MATTERS

The emergence of post-modern, secular societies with their radical recasting of the meaning of toleration requires that one move from toleration *sensu stricto* to tolerance now understood as soft acceptance without a public hint of rejection^h. This change is tied to profound changes in ordinary expectations. Among them is the demoralization and deflation of traditional sexual and reproductive norms with the consequent dramatic alteration of the very texture of everyday life. The tolerance of difference in sexual activity (e.g., choosing one’s sexual partner as a member of a different sex, the same sex, or an animal) involves more than abandoning the implicit negative moralization involved in toleration and requires acceptance of what had once been able to be recognized as sinful, but is now according to the secular culture to be accepted as a life-style choice. The category of sin in general and of sexual sin in particular is now forbidden by the dominant secular culture. The results are widespread and dramatic. After all, sex is a major motive force. How one regards sex and engages in sexual relations as well as how men and women bond sexually significantly shapes the life-world. Sex is powerful. Sex matters. Sex is one of the major framing forces

that shape a society. The dominant secular culture seeks to render consensual sexual acts beyond sin and beyond moral judgment, thus transforming and further secularizing society. How we regard ourselves, our bodies, and carnal relations structures large areas of life. These are complex matters about which quite different accounts can be givenⁱ.

We now live in a life-world in which concubinage has become ubiquitous and is as acceptable as marriage. It is now taken for granted that men and women may live together, hook up, and be sexual partners, all without benefit of clergy. Mothers now without hesitation or shame speak of their daughters having moved in with their boyfriends (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2012, Finer 2007, Greenwood & Guner 2010). It is no longer an embarrassment, at least in many social classes, to have one’s daughter reproduce outside of marriage (Murray 2012). Public advertisements and discussions have come to substitute “partner” for “spouse”, as in “Your partner wants the spartan purity of uncarpeted hardwoods” (Anonymous 2013, p. D1). There has been the emergence of a dominant secular culture in which sexual relations and reproduction outside of the marriage of a man and a woman are no longer recognized as shameful or marked by guilt. As Vattimo has observed, “Belief in the importance of sexuality in human life is gradually waning” (Vattimo 2011, p. 56). Sex has become a civil right (Wheeler 2012). The taken-for-granted character and moral significance of sexual activity, pair bonding, and reproduction have changed radically from what it had been in the 1950s. Moreover, the new ethos of toleration requires that one not speak publicly in condemnation of

h. The contemporary understanding of tolerance affirmed by the now-dominant secular culture is much more affirmatory of the object of tolerance than T. M. Scanlon appreciates (Scanlon 2003).

i. One might consider the general account of the transformation of society given by John Milbank. “Both Durkheim and Weber categorize societies in terms of the relation of the individual to something social and universal, and this reflects the perspective of modern Western politics, whose prime concern is the ‘bodily’ mediation between the unlimited sovereignty of the State and the self-will of the individual. As a grid, or frame through which to view all societies, this perspective tends to occlude the fact that for many non-Western, or pre-modern societies, what matters is not the binary individual/society contrast, but the hierarchical ordering of different status groupings, and the distribution of roles according to a complex sense of common value. Sociology, of course, registers this difference, but it does so negatively, in terms of the observation that organic and hierarchical societies exercise strong ‘control’ over the individual, as if the member of this traditional society were secretly shadowed by the presence of the modern, self-determining subject. In consequence, the relation of the individual to the whole—which defines only modern politics—is seen as the universal site of the social, and it follows that all the complex rituals, hierarchies, and religious views which go to make up the stratified, organic society can be ‘explained’ in terms of the functional maintaining of strong control of the whole over the individual parts. Such ‘explanation’ is only regarded as more than tautology because the normative perspective of modernity allows one to think that there is always a dimension of pure ‘social action’, pure ‘social power’, occurring between the individual and the social, and separable from its ritual, symbolic or linguistic embodiment. But ‘a social whole’ apart from the interactions of the various norms and strata is a reifying abstraction, and there is no ‘social action’ definable or comprehensible apart from its peculiar linguistic manifestation, the inexplicability of the particular symbolic system” (Milbank 2006, 103-104).

these immense changes in sexual mores, or even publicly seriously consider their adverse consequences.

To repeat the above with a slightly different emphasis: sexual activity and reproduction have been demoralized into life-style choices as the West has become fully post-Christian, indeed after God. It is no longer a subject of guilt and/or shame to have sex or to live together outside of wedlock. Moreover, it is no longer a subject of guilt and/or shame to have children outside of wedlock (Murray 2012, chap. 3). This is not to claim that in the past fornication or adultery was infrequent, or that many did not give illegitimate issue. What is different is that in the past, vice through hypocrisy regularly paid tribute to virtue. Sexual and reproductive indiscretions *ceteris paribus* brought official social disapproval and established social costs, which the rich and/or powerful such as Pope Alexander VI (1431–1503, elected 1492) could avoid. However much honored in the breach, there were publicly established sexual mores that reflected traditional Christian commitments and views of the body. This is no longer the case. Western public sexual and reproductive mores have changed fundamentally. In the process, the meaning of the body in¹⁰ Western culture has changed as well. Although the recent changes were long in coming, and although they have deep roots in Western culture, the changes over the last half-century have been rapid and dramatic.

To give an example from Germany as it was before the recent cultural transformations: on the 6th of March, 1970, I took my wife to the university hospital in Bonn, Germany, so that she could be delivered of our second child. I was there as a Fulbright post-graduate fellow studying Kant and Hegel. On entering the hospital, the admitting clerks asked for proof of marriage in order to determine whether to record our child as legitimate or as a bastard. Not having traveled to Germany with a copy of our marriage license, I explained to the hospital officials that we were citizens of Texas and that a common-law marriage was sufficient to ensure legitimacy. Then I elaborated that the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a common-law marriage were that the couple be male and female, that they hold themselves

openly and notoriously to be husband and wife, and that they have had intercourse. We manifestly met the conditions. The next morning after the birth of our daughter, I was visited in my wife's room by a hospital official who joyfully informed me that he had called the American Embassy in Bad Godesberg, which had confirmed that my account of common-law marriage in Texas was correct; my daughter would be registered as legitimate.

In stark contrast, the Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (EKD) in June of 2013 took an important step towards the erasure from the public consciousness of the dominant German culture of distinctions such as between legitimate and illegitimate unions with reference to a marriage of a man and a woman (Kirchenamt of EKD 2013). In the statement, the EKD sought to forge a view of the family that encompassed not just a husband and a wife with children (in the past, widows and widowers with children constituted a deficient case of a family), but families of single women, along with homosexual unions. Absent was any of the traditional Christian recognition that sexual activity or reproduction outside of the marriage of a man and a woman was deeply wrongly directed. The body was assumed to be open to peaceable consensual use in sexual activity and reproduction. The body *qua* body had become at least implicitly regarded as a neutral instrument available for peaceable sexual and reproductive uses by consenting persons. The body was no longer recognized as bringing with it constraining norms.

The view advanced by the EKD regarding sexual acts and reproduction is, to say the least, very distant from the position taken by St. Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians.

Now the body is not for fornication, but for the Lord; and the Lord for the body. And God both raised up the Lord, and will raise up us by His own power. Ye know that your bodies are members of Christ, do ye not? Having taken up then the members of Christ, shall I make them members of a harlot? May it not be! Or know ye not that he that is joined to the harlot is one body? For, "The

two,” saith He, “shall be into one flesh.” But he who is joined to the Lord is one spirit. Keep on fleeing fornication. Every sin whatsoever a man might do is outside the body, but he who committeth fornication sinneth against his own body. Or know ye not that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit Who is in you, Whom ye have from God, and ye are not your own? For ye were bought with a price; glorify then God in your body and in your spirit, which are God’s (I Cor 6:13–20).

Unlike the EKD’s statement, St. Paul gives special attention to the evil of fornication. In our dominant culture, opposing fornication is by itself astonishing enough. The reason for St. Paul’s condemnation of fornication is now even more culturally alien: the special evil of illicit sexual unions lies in uniting one’s body with the body of another person who is not one’s spouse. More precisely, the evil of fornication is best understood in terms of its being a use of one’s body that is improper in being incompatible with sanctification of one’s body. Sexual intercourse for traditional Christians is a serious matter because of the union effected between two bodies. As Christ put it with regard to marriage, “the two shall become one flesh” (Matt 19:5). The body is central. While the marriage bed is undefiled, that of fornicators and adulterers is defiled. “Let marriage be held in honor by all, and let the marriage bed be kept undefiled; for God will judge fornicators and adulterers” (Heb 13:4). This view has remained integral to traditional Christianity.

St. Paul’s statements should not be taken to deny that before Christ patriarchs and kings were at liberty without wrong-doing to take concubines, a point attested to in Genesis (25:6) and elsewhere, and about which Moses Maimonides reflects in the *Mishneh Torah*. The issue of concubinage is important and complex, but it is irrelevant to Christians for whom concubinage and fornication are materially equivalent. With

the Resurrection, the normative monogamy of Adam and Eve is restored. Within traditional Christianity, unabsolved fornicators who have not been re-admitted to the chalice are barred from receiving Communion^k, which exclusion is a cardinal criterion for Christians. When before the distribution of the Holy Gifts the deacon says: “With fear of God and faith and love, draw near” (*Liturgikon* 1994, p. 307), this warning reminds congregants that one should only approach the chalice after prayer, fasting, and the approval of one’s spiritual father. The Liturgy, guided by the canons, takes account of what has happened to the body.

In the dominant secular culture, in contrast, the very notion of sexual immorality has become a puzzling, if not an inaccessible notion. Why the consensual use of medicine for reproductive purposes (i.e., the use of donor gametes) should be a problem for bioethics is no longer apparent. A complex set of normative changes has altered a broad sweep of everyday life, changing the life-world and the experience of the body within the dominant culture. The result is that the use of the consensual body in sexual activity and reproduction has been demoralized into the concerns of life-style choices, so that such use is no longer of direct moral concern to bioethicists. Consensual uses of the body in sexual activity and reproduction involve choices that the dominant secular culture cannot find right or wrong, good or bad. Within the life-world of the dominant secular culture, sex and reproduction outside of marriage have become as unproblematic as having a meal on the run.

How did this watershed change in the public culture occur? Crucial was the loss of the traditional Christian understanding of the body. The dominant secular culture, given its commitments, ceased to endorse the traditional Christian project of sanctifying the body, of having it turned into a holy relic. This change has roots in the Western moral-philosophical project of specifying and justifying through reason the appropriate character

j. Moses Maimonides in commenting on the prerogative of kings to have concubines remarks: “The Oral Tradition states that he may take no more than eighteen wives. The figure eighteen includes both wives and concubines” (Maimonides 2001, p. 518).

k. For an overview of the Orthodox Christian position regarding fornication, see Jubilee Bishops’ Council 2000, pp. 43-44, X.6.

of the moral life. The good, the right, and the virtuous came to be understood without any necessary reference to the holy, much less to the sanctification of the body^l. The inability of the dominant secular culture properly to appreciate the importance of the body in the human encounter with the transcendently holy is a function of contemporary Western thought having given central place to a view of agency within which the body becomes a means as instrument for the realization of merely immanent goals. In contrast, for traditional Christians, the sanctification of the body was and is understood in terms of a transforming encounter with the transcendently Holy. The body is now understood in terms of the narratives that persons tell about their own bodies.

Surely, a number of views can be advanced about how one ought to characterize the now-dominant secular culture and its appreciation of the body. Here, I underscore one dimension of these changes, one that has roots in a way of regarding the human condition that grew out of the Enlightenment through Kant (1724–1804), and that was then importantly transformed by cultural forces crucially appreciated and reinforced by, among other people, G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831). The result is the contemporary post-modern view of the moral life in which each person is free peaceably with consensual others to have and pursue his own vision of sexual and reproductive flourishing. The meaning of the body is now nested within a narrative of the Spirit, Geist, Absolute Spirit (a notion to which more attention will be given in chapter 8). It is a view through which traditional Christian morality, including the sexual and reproductive morality that was still embraced by Kant, became demoralized and deflated. The result is that much of what had been understood as moral choices regarding sexuality and reproduction are transformed into personal life-style choices. Among the consequences is that heterosexual marriage and the traditional fam-

ily have at the very least been culturally marginalized. As Hegel recognized, Kant's Christian morality, which Kant sets after Christ as Messiah and God, cannot be sustained. The morality of sexual acts, reproduction, and the family becomes a morality located within a Christianity, indeed a culture, after God^m.

The body is central in the life of the Church. This is the case because, among other things, the bodies of true theologians, the bodies of holy fathers and mothers, have been sanctified so that to touch them is to make physical contact with the uncreated energies of God. It is for this reason that traditional Christians seek to touch relics and that relics are placed in the altars of churches, becoming central to the Liturgy. Indeed, Canon VII of the Seventh Ecumenical Council (Nicea II, A.D. 787) affirms the tradition of always having relics in the altar of a church. As the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I remarked regarding the culture of traditional Christianity and the centrality of the sanctification of the body:

...the change of man's essence, theosis by grace, is a fact that is tangible for all the Orthodox faithful. Grace is not only obtained through the transformed relics of the saints, which is totally inexplicable without acceptance of the divine. Grace also radiates from living Saints who are truly in the likeness of the Lord [Luke 8:46]. ... Grace can also be obtained by the presence of the Saints who have influenced and sanctified, and to a degree transformed, natural objects and places (Bartholomew 1997).

At stake is that sanctification of the body as recorded in Acts regarding the living body of St. Paul. "God did extraordinary miracles through Paul, so that when the handkerchiefs or aprons that had touched his skin were brought to the sick, their diseases left them, and the evil spirits came out of them" (Acts 19:12–12). St. Paul's body was sanctified. To touch his body was to make contact with God's uncreated energies.

l. Orthodox Christianity embraced the theological rather than the philosophical horn of the dilemma Plato poses in the *Euthyphro*. If one understands the choice, *grosso modo*, as between holding that the holy can be understood in terms of the right, the good, and the virtuous, or that the right, the good, and the virtuous can only be understood in terms of the holy, Orthodox Christianity affirms the latter. See Engelhardt 2000, chapter 4.

m. For Kant, Christianity is to be evacuated of transcendent force and be left only with moral meaning. "The Christian principle of morality is not theological and thus heteronomous, being rather the autonomy of pure practical reason itself" (Kant 1956, p. 133). However, as Hegel shows, the content of the moral reason does not follow from reason, but is given in a particular sociohistorically conditioned context. See G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §150.

Because of this early Christian appreciation of the sanctification of the body, there was from Christianity's beginning a concern to gather up the relics of the martyrs. Even after their deaths, it was recognized that their bodies remained sanctified. "For only the harder portions of his holy remains were left, which were conveyed to Antioch and wrapped in linen, as an inestimable treasure left to the holy Church by the grace which was in the martyr" (Roberts & Donaldson 1994, *The martyrdom of Ignatius vi*, vol. 1, p. 131). Again, for example, "The Martyrdom of Polycarp" records that after his death

...the jealous and envious evil one who resists the family of the righteous, when he saw the greatness of his martyrdom, and his blameless career from the beginning, and that he was crowned with the crown of immortality, and had carried off the unspeakable prize, took care that not even his poor body should be taken away by us, though many desired to do this, and to have fellowship with his holy flesh (Lake 1965, p. 335, XVII.1).

Then "The Martyrdom" reports that after St. Polycarp's body was burned by the Romans, "we, at last, took up his bones, more precious than precious stones, and finer than gold, and put them where it was meet" (Lake 1965, p. 337, XVIII.1). The bodies of St. Ignatius and St. Polycarp were holy. The Christians were interested in their relics because their bodies had been sanctified. It was for this reason that Liturgies were celebrated on the relics of martyrsⁿ.

This understanding is vividly alive in Orthodox Christianity, which recognizes the importance of sanctifying both body and soul. For example, due to the importance of sanctification of the body, the priest during the Liturgy in the "Prayer of the Thrice-Holy Hymn" (the Trisagion) asks, "Pardon us every transgression both voluntary and involuntary; sanctify our

souls and bodies" (*Liturgikon* 1994, p. 263). The goal is not just that one's soul becomes holy, but that one's body becomes holy. Again, in the "Prayer before the Gospel" the priest says, "For thou art the Illumination of our souls and bodies, O Christ our God" (*Liturgikon* 1994, p. 267). There is no sense of seeking a spiritual transformation apart from the body. The body is no mere prison of the soul. The same point is underscored when, after the second "Litany of the Faithful" in the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, the priest asks God to "cleanse our souls and bodies from every defilement of flesh or spirit" (*Liturgikon* 1994, p. 272), as well as in the prayer before the Our Father in the Liturgy of St. Basil the Great. "Purify us from every defilement of flesh and spirit..." (*Liturgikon* 1994, p. 299). Finally, in the thanksgiving prayer after Communion in this same Liturgy, the priest prays, "We give thanks unto Thee, O Lord our God, for the participation in Thy holy, immaculate, immortal and heavenly mysteries, which Thou hast given unto us for the welfare and sanctification and healing of our souls and bodies" (*Liturgikon* 1994, p. 309). The project is to seek through grace, that is, through the uncreated energies of God, not just to transform the soul but also the body.

This approach of traditional Christianity is not the approach to the body, morality, and bioethics that characterizes the contemporary dominant secular culture. In this contemporary culture, one finds instead a narrative cut off from any anchor in being beyond the being supported by particular narratives sustained within particular free-standing accounts, all articulated within the horizon of the finite and the immanent^o. How did we end up in this current state of affairs? Faced with the challenges posed by David Hume (1711–1776), Immanuel Kant attempted not only to indicate the necessary character of claims made by Euclidean geometry and Newton's physics, but to preserve the content and

n. The ancient Church maintained the practice of celebrating Liturgy over the relics of martyrs. See, for example, Canon XX of Gangra (A.D. 340) and Canon VII of Nicea II (A.D. 787) (Doig 2008, p. 89; Freeman 2011, p. 13).

o. Judd Owen offers a succinct overview of the predicament of contemporary secular morality. The growing consensus among intellectuals today is that liberalism itself, like everything else human, is the product of a "cultural bias." Rorty agrees. We are "without a skyhook with which to escape from the ethnocentrism produced by acculturation" (1991, 2). Liberal democracy does not transcend ethnocentrism; it is a form of ethnocentrism (Owen 2001, p. 16).

binding force of Christian morality, however without Christ as God. Kant's grand project, grounded among other things in his solution to the Third Antinomy in the First *Critique* (i.e., the issue as to whether humans are causally determined or free), led Kant to conceiving of moral agents *qua* moral (and therefore for him noumenal) agents as choosing apart from any causal nexus, including sociohistorically conditioned forces. Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy imposed a cleft between humans as bodies and humans as free agents. This approach made impossible any appreciation of the sanctification of the body, the rejection of which had already been underscored in the destruction of relics during the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution. As already noted, Hegel realized that the emerging secular culture had taken things much farther. The dominant secular culture had radically recast traditional Western Christian views through averting the cultural gaze from everything that could claim to be in itself apart from its being for us. As we saw in chapter 2, this is the force of Hegel's famous pronouncement in 1802 of God's death. In his essay "Glauben und Wissen" [Faith and Knowledge], Hegel recognized the cultural change ingredient in "the feeling that 'God Himself is dead,' upon which the religion of more recent times rests" (Hegel 1977, p. 190; Hegel 1968, pp. 413–4).

Hegel was willing not only to face the death of God in the vanguard culture of his day, but he had also come to terms with the consequences Kant had hoped to avoid: without a God's-eye perspective, not only would the right not always trump the good, but morality would not always trump prudence (Engelhardt 2010a, 2010b). In the contemporary culture, being is only for us, and all categories, including all morality, are sociohistorically conditioned. Hegel realized that the very sense of morality was transformed, once it was placed after God. As we will see more clearly by the end of this chapter, without a transcendent God's-eye perspective, law and public policy by default become the higher truth of morality (Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, #211). Law and public policy are the reality of a secular society's effective norms. As a further consequence, the

state becomes an immanent substitute for God (*ibid.*, #258). This restatement of morality as the ethics incarnate in and reduced to law and public policy provided the basis for Richard Rorty (1931–2007) and the later John Rawls (1921–2002) to have politics substitute for morality. After all, no one canonical morality can be identified. But law can be established. In the absence of a God's-eye perspective to ground secular morality and bioethics, the state sustains the unity and specific meaning of a society's norms by establishing those norms at law and in public policy. Although many saw the earlier Rawls as vindicating the powers of moral philosophy, by 1985 Rawls had rejected the claim that his *Theory of Justice* provided a generally justifiable moral defense of justice as fairness. He was left with advancing a political rather than a moral proposal (Rawls 1985).

This state of affairs has vast implications for how one ought to understand the bioethics of the body, sexual activity, and reproduction. Within the dominant secular perspective, there is nothing to be said about the sanctification of the body as a result of an encounter with the transcendently Holy. There is nothing that one can say concerning acts that defile, that preclude sanctifying contact with the Holy. In liberal democracies, one has at best the requirement that one peaceably pursue the satisfaction of one's sexual and reproductive preferences (dare one say, one's desires), whatever they may be, with consenting others within perhaps the constraints of law. But what should those constraints be? In the absence of philosophy's being able to establish canonical moral constraints, that is, after the immanentization which Hegel recognized (Engelhardt 2010b), there is nothing that can be specifically affirmed for persons in general. One has at best a thin aesthetic to replace moral norms. One's body is whatever one makes of it within the horizon of the finite and the immanent. It is persons who weave a narrative about their bodies, not bodies that set nonnegotiable limits to these narratives.

Once there is no ultimate point of reference, the meaning of the body is to be fabricated, that is, constituted, through various life-style choices that nest the body within various and diverse free-floating narratives.

Bodies, along with sexuality and reproduction, become what one peaceably makes of them with consenting others, and increasingly with the assistance of medicine as through technologically mediated reproductive means (e.g., *in vitro* fertilization and embryo transfer). That is, humans are recognized rather as rights and dignity bearers (whatever that might mean) who with other humans are at liberty peaceably to constitute within their own narratives the meaning of their bodies with consenting others. In the contemporary dominant culture, an appreciation of the body as it had been recognized in traditional Christianity is gone. The body has been relocated within a culture in which an agnostic if not an atheistic methodological postulate dominates. All is to be appreciated as if it were ultimately meaningless, receiving only provisional meaning from particular narratives. The body is no longer acknowledged, set within God-imposed norms, as central to the human encounter with a radically transcendent God Who conveys sanctification, and through Whom there is the resurrection of the body.

SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTION AS LIFE-STYLE CHOICES

The transformation of the public mores of sexuality and reproduction, as Francis Fukuyama correctly observes, was abetted by many factors, important among them the easy availability of effective, reliable, cheap contraception. Effective and cheap contraception allowed one fairly reliably to separate the reproductive dimension of sexuality from the social and recreational dimensions of sexuality (Fukuyama 1999). There was no longer the same fear that sexual activity before marriage might produce a child out of wedlock, a burden to the woman, as well as to her family, along with the duty on the part of the man to marry the woman or at least to provide child support. An important economic motivation for traditional sexual morality was weakened. However, the availability of cheap and effective contraception is not the sole factor that produced this radical change in sexual mores (Goldin & Katz 2000). At the

same time effective contraception became available, it also became more acceptable for a woman to have a child without being married, leading to a comprehensive change in cultural expectations regarding sexual activity, child-bearing, and marriage. There has been a foundational change in sexual and reproductive mores. Among the major themes of conflict and contrast is that defining the gulf separating secular career-oriented women from traditional Christian and Orthodox Jewish women who hope to be housewives, have five or more children, and thus do the will of God. These housewives, contrary to liberal secular women, see true fulfillment for a woman to be realized through being the mother of many children and raising them for the Lord. They realize not just that she who rocks the cradle will shape the future of the world; they have a transcendent focus (“the woman shall be saved through childbearing” [I Tim 2:15]).

Within the dominant secular culture, the traditional Christian family is counter-cultural and sexist. Among other things, it is grounded in a gender-essentialism that affirms the authority of husbands. Genesis states that humans were created so as to be two different sexes (“Male and female he created them” – Genesis 1:27), a point that Christ Himself emphasizes: (Mark 10:6; see also Matthew 19:4). Moreover, the resulting relationship of husband and wife goes against the grain of a socio-democratic culture. Eve, the proto-typical woman, is made for Adam to be his helpmate, not the man for the woman (Genesis 2:18; 1 Timothy 2:11–15; I Corinthians 11:9). This relationship requires that wives submit to their husband (Ephesians 5:22) and show respect for their husbands as they would for Christ (Ephesians 5:33). The traditional Christian vision of the family as the domestic church united under the headship of the husband goes against contemporary egalitarian passions. As St. John Chrysostom summarizes, the family is “not to be a democracy, but a monarchy; and as in an army, this order one may see in every family. In the rank of monarch, for instance, there is the husband; but in the rank of lieutenant and general, the wife; and the children too are allotted a third station in command” (Chryso-

stom 1994, p. 204). This inequality in the authority of husbands and wives has broad implications and lies at the root of the impossibility of having Christian priestesses. The traditional Christian family finds itself grounded in a structure that is before and beyond the consent of its members.

Of course, men are instructed by the dominant secular culture that it is improper, indeed morally exploitative, of them to seek a wife who wishes to be a housewife and mother. Men are told that they are not to be obstacles to their wives' (partners') self-realization, self-fulfillment, and self-expression. The whole image of being a father and breadwinner has thus also been transformed. A complex realignment of social roles has occurred so that if women have children, they are placed in daycare centers and/or men are asked to take on their share of what traditionally had been "women's work". In contrast, within fundamentalist patriarchal Christianities, men are expected to find a virtuous woman who will be a suitable helper (Genesis 2:20), bearing his children and tending to the home, while he keeps righteous order while supporting the family, raising sons and daughters for the Lord. As always, the roles of men and women dialectically influence each other. As the contraceptive and abortion revolution placed fewer costs on women for sexual activities outside of marriage, the roles of men changed as well, which then further changed the roles of women. That is, sexual freedom for women led to more sexual license for men. No longer concerned about fathering a child and living up to the role of prime breadwinner and authoritative father, the man also is freed from his responsibilities, so that pre-marital sex and extra-marital sex are merely life-style choices. Indeed, boys who do not bed a girl early in their teens are told by Western culture that they are "gay"—creating more "gay" men. It is now expected by many that men will be unfaithful, and there are even "marriage therapists" who

will encourage married partners to have open marriages, based on the view that it is better to have open marriages than to have husbands and wives who "cheat" on each other, where cheat does not mean committing adultery, but only having clandestine sexual affairs.

This re-evaluation or more precisely devaluation of choices regarding sexual behavior, reproduction, and abortion from moral issues into issues of life-style choices is a surrender before the power of the drive to have sex. Over the history of mankind, the avoidance of fornication, adultery, and homosexual acts has been notoriously difficult. Yet, the recognition of norms allowed the possibility of repentance and the struggle towards virtue. The positive side of sinning is that after sinning one can with full energies repent. The struggle with sin is also the struggle to salvation. Now that sexual choices have been placed beyond morality and sin, none of this can be appreciated. A central dimension of human moral struggle and experience has been radically altered, if not forgotten. Sexuality no longer offers an opportunity to re-orient human concerns to God, but provides only an opportunity for acquiescence in the plurality of human desires.

These changes in the sexual mores of the dominant culture were in great measure promoted by feminism and by the women's liberation movements^p, along with movements that forthrightly endorsed personal sexual fulfillment on the part of women. Women were informed that they are now in control of their own sexual lives and that this among other things means that they are free on a par with men to make sexual choices and to enjoy sex without marriage^q. An example is the emergence of a "hook-up" culture, particularly on college campuses, within which women in the pursuit of success eschew emotional involvement but have "hook-up buddies" to provide sexual satisfaction without emotional or other encumbrances^r. These changes in sexual mores

p. For a defense of the radical recasting of the roles of the sexes and the understanding of the family, see the feminist arguments of Susan Okin (1989).

q. The 1960s and 1970s were awash with a literature that celebrated sexual lust in its own right. Consider, for example, Shiraishi 1975. In addition, one might think of Patti Smith's Witt, especially her poem "Rape" (Smith 1973, p. 24). Here belongs also much of the poetry of Leonard Cohen. Consider, for example, the poem "the 15-year-old girls" (Cohen 1972, p. 97).

r. For an account of "hooking-up" as a successful strategy for ambitious secularized women, see, for example, "Hearts of steel: Single girls master the hook-up" in Rosin 2012, pp. 17-46.

are not simply the consequence of cheap and effective contraception, but are part of a major cultural change connected to the secularization and deChristianization of the dominant culture of the West, which demoralized traditional morality. It was driven in part by what Bernice Martin terms the expressive revolution.

In the last few decades the Western world has experienced a transformation in the assumptions and habitual practices which form the cultural bedrock of the daily lives of ordinary people. ... The shift began as a sort of cultural revolution among a small minority of crusading radicals, and finished by altering some of our deepest—and therefore most customary and commonplace—habits and assumptions (Martin 1981, p. 1).

The focus is both hedonic and reproductive, on both pleasure and the possibility of new social structures framing reproduction (e.g., a single woman reproducing contrary to traditional norms and outside of traditional social structures), and was combined with a discounting of personal responsibility, especially regarding the negative effects of raising children outside of marriage.

Traditional sexual norms, including traditional views of marriage, were brought into question by being regarded as obstacles to self-fulfillment, self-realization, and self-expression. Traditional sexual mores became surd constraints from the past that were to be removed. The result was a cultural revolution aimed against the traditional Christian ethos of sex, reproduction, and marriage^s.

The counter-culture of the 1960s was an attempt to make all life into an evening of freedom when the 'thou' had full sway. It wanted to dispense with the masks too, to integrate the self below the mask with the freedom which the mask alone had hitherto conferred (Martin 1981, p. 15).

An epiphanal assertion of the new sexual mores was the Woodstock gathering (August 15–18, 1969)^t. Norms that had for centuries directed sexual behavior (hypocrisy and non-compliance notwithstanding) were weakening, if not collapsing. Not only was the character of sexual choices changed through the advent of cheap and effective contraception, but a new, post-Christian, counter-cultural ethos emerged. Woodstock constituted the secular equivalent of the Great Awakening of Protestantism at Cane Ridge, Kentucky, 6 August 1801. Rather than involving spasmodic responses to whatever spirits ruled that day (the revival was characterized by strange spasmodic dancing marked by uncontrollable jerky movements), the Woodstock gathering focused on setting Christian sexual norms aside. The transformation of the sexual and reproductive ethos was in the end so thoroughgoing as to render what had been a counter-culture into the social norm, or at least into choices that, given the transformation of the meaning and norms of toleration, no longer produced a public, adverse, moral judgment^u. Sexual life-style choices were no longer matters about which physicians should in chastisement talk with their patients.

The established public morality bearing on sexual relations, pair bonding, reproduction, and the meaning of marriage was thus altered, with implications far beyond sexual relations. The geography of moral authority changed. In particular, the traditional authority of fathers and husbands was brought into question. How men and women tended to relate to each other changed fundamentally. Within the dominant secular culture, sexual choices that had been recognized as involving important right-making conditions, goods, and virtues were rendered into life-style choices directed only by vague, quasi-aesthetic, but surely not by traditional moral and bioethical norms. The moral and bioethical norms that did become salient reflected liberal concerns

s. For a picture at the beginning of the 1960s of the generation that was seeking to lose itself and rebel against established norms, see *Beatitude Anthology* 1960.

t. Woodstock involved a rejection of traditional mores and an invitation to a new post-moral order. It took place as a music festival held publicly on acreage belonging to Max Yasgur's dairy farm near Bethel, New York. See also Heelas 1996.

u. The number of children born outside of a traditional marriage has increased from slightly over one out of twenty to slightly over four out of ten. This demographic development has recast the very life-world of marriage and reproduction (Hamilton, Martin & Ventura 2012).

regarding autonomy, equality, human dignity, and notions of human rights born of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which carried with them no prohibition against consensual sexual activities. These norms and the ethos they valorized envisaged persons as bare individuals without religion, race, history, family, or gender. As long as these general Enlightenment norms were not violated, sexual and reproductive choices were taken to fall within the domain of the morally and bioethically acceptable.

These changes in mores were associated with various societal changes through which, *inter alia*, young women came to live apart from their parents, absent parental supervision and in the absence of social structures that placed their activities within a communally shared vision of traditional mores. This occurred in part because of more young women entering college, combined with the abolishment of often strictly overseen single-sex college housing for women in favor of common housing for both male and female students. Away from parental oversight, under the pressure of college life, confronted with a post-traditional sexual ethos, and beset by their own strong sexual urges, many women forgot their mothers' warning that if men have easy access to sex, men will not be as motivated to marry, much less remain bonded to one woman. The ethos of sexual liberation instructed and encouraged young women to adopt a different approach to sexual intercourse, changing the strategies that once encouraged stable monogamy. Casual sexual relations were valorized as authentic expressions of a young woman's freedom from arbitrary parental authority and outworn cultural norms. With the advent of cheap and effective contraception, along with the availability of abortion, combined with a cultural endorsement of sexual self-fulfillment and self-realization, and in the face of the sexual passions of youth, college sexual life-styles, indeed sexual life-styles in general, were transformed.

The result has been a continued, indeed accelerated transformation of the ethos and ethics of sexuality, reproduction, and marriage within the dominant culture. There has been as well a dramatic change in what is socially acceptable, as well as a change in the moral norms by which behavior is to be judged. This has been connected with a weakening of guidance from the Western Christianities. "The preaching of premarital chastity, which used to feature so prominently in the education of Catholic youth down to the 1960s and even beyond, has faded from view" (Vattimo 2004, p. 61). Having sex has become as morally significant as having a drink of water when thirsty. Sociologically, Vattimo has it right: "Belief in the importance of sexuality in human life is gradually waning" (Vattimo 2011, p. 56). This radical deflation of the significance of sexuality is tied to the centrality given to the pursuit of happiness understood as the pursuit of pleasure. On this point, Rorty summarizes the issue succinctly in claiming that we "have no moral obligations except helping one another satisfy our desires, thus achieving the greatest possible amount of happiness" (Rorty 2011, p. 8). Sexual satisfaction has become integral to the pursuit of happiness.

A culture emerged in which the erotic has become more omnipresent, while at the same time being stripped of moral significance. In addition, the moral significance of the bond between marriage and reproduction has been abolished. There is not only more open casual sex and more open cohabitation, but there are fewer children born per woman with a greater percentage of those children entering the world from outside of a traditional marriage. In 1960 there were 18.1 children born for every thousand Italian women; by 2012 there were only 9.06. Also in 1960 only 2.4% of Italians were born outside of a traditional marriage; by 2012 this had risen to 24.9%^v. The changes in the United States were as dramatic (Martin et al. 2012). In the United States, 23.7 children were born for every thousand women in 1960 and 13.66 children in 2013. As to illegitimacy,

v. Birth rate in 1960: http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/hea_bir_rat_cru_per_1000_peo-crude-per-1-000-people&date=1960; birth rate in 2012: <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=it&cv=25>; out-of-wedlock births in 1960: <http://demoblography.blogspot.com/2007/06/percentage-of-out-of-wedlock-births-in.html>; out-of-wedlock births in 2012: <http://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=16264> [accessed 5 December 2013].

5.3% of all children were born outside of marriage in 1960; this had risen to 40.7% in 2011^w.

As just observed, these profound changes are the result of many factors, including not just the availability of effective contraception that made sexual intercourse seem more risk-free, but also the influence of various movements that placed an enhanced accent on individual autonomy as well as on individual self-realization, self-fulfillment, self-satisfaction, and self-expression. In addition and crucially, there was an expansion of a state-supported welfare system for unmarried women that made it economically easier, and at times even attractive, to reproduce outside of marriage. Welfare programs encouraged extramarital reproduction. The goal of such welfare programs was to liberate women from a dependence on men so as to allow women “greater freedom” to choose as they wished. In the United States, these welfare programs *de facto* targeted blacks and their impact was disproportionately greater on blacks (Moynihan 1965). In 1965 only 24% of black children were born outside of marriage (Akerlof et al. 1996). By 2011 this had risen to 72.3% (Hamilton et al. 2012). Such significant adverse consequences effected the large-scale destruction of the black family, leading to the loss of significant moral and social capital. This all happened as there was also the emergence of a suspicion of authority figures, especially the authority of husbands and fathers. The result has been that an increasing proportion of children now grow up without the coherent presence of a father, especially of a biological father who is the husband of their mother. The authority of religion and the authority of God were discounted as well during this period. Those who in the past would have strongly restrained such sexual license (e.g., the Roman Catholic clergy) did so less often, while some of these authority

figures did the very opposite and affirmed sexual and reproductive license, while also engaging in the sexual abuse of children. A culture emerged that marginalized the disciplinary, authoritative father who preserved the virginity of his daughters. Sexual urges that have always been notoriously difficult to discipline and contain found an affirmation in this newly dominant secular ethos of sexual self-realization, self-satisfaction, self-fulfillment, and self-expression.

A new sexual and reproductive ethos had taken shape and was established as a dimension of the now-dominant secular culture forming a basis for contemporary secular bioethics. The erotic had been valorized, while giving birth to children became regarded with some suspicion. After all, raising children interferes with the wholehearted pursuit of self-satisfaction; children are a burden. This devaluation of reproduction was in the 1960s and afterward supported by various apocalyptic views of a population explosion in the face of limited resources. It became plausible to many that the decoupling of sexual pleasure from reproduction was not only to be affirmed in its own right for various self-directed reasons, but it was also to be affirmed on altruistic grounds in order to avoid supposed ecological disasters^x. As a consequence, the erotic became more salient just as the number of children produced dropped. This sexual and reproductive ethos was tied to a new normative understanding of how women should live their lives. Among other things, the new ethos was built around an affirmation of women entering and succeeding in the workplace on an equal footing with men. Women were to find as much fulfillment as men in having a job and, if possible, a profession. Any interest that might exist to have children is to be relocated within the commitment to placing women fully and equally alongside

w. Birth rate in 1960: http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/hea_bir_rat_cru_per_1000_peo-crude-per-1-000-people&date=1960; birth rate in 2013: http://www.indexmundi.com/united_states/birth_rate.html; out-of-wedlock births in 1960: <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.htm>; out-of-wedlock births in 2011: <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarry.htm> [accessed September 2, 2013]

x. Concerns about the supposedly drastic and imminent threats from overpopulation became a focus of intellectual discussions during the mid-1960s. Prominent was Paul Ehrlich's (1932–) book, *The Population Bomb*, which painted the picture of an imminent threat of starvation and unraveling of some of the structures of civilization (Ehrlich 1968). In this, he was criticized by Julian Simon (1932–1998) (Simon 1981; Myers & Simon 1994). Sentiments such as those affirmed by Paul Ehrlich led to further apocalyptic predictions of the environmental consequences of an uncontrolled population explosion, as in the report prepared for the Club of Rome. See Meadows 1974. For a similar example, see Council 1980-1981. For a recent review of some of these matters in particular the debate between Paul Ehrlich and Julian Simon, see Sabin 2013.

men in the workplace. At the same time, women are to seek sexual pleasure and fulfillment on a basis equal to men, as described by Helen Gurley Brown, who valorized the role of sex in career advancement (1962, 1965). But the difficulty remains, women not men get pregnant. In order to ensure the equality of women in sexual activity and in their entrance into the workplace on a par with men, there has to be robust protection against unplanned motherhood.

There was, of course, the possibility that the traditional culture would have been able to maintain itself along with traditional structures and boundaries. As Martin also notes, “If structure and boundary maintenance become strong enough, then expressive pleasure—food, sex—can *only* occur at unspontaneous, programmed times” (Martin 1981, p. 15). However, as a matter of fact, the traditional culture failed to respond effectively to the emerging post-traditional culture. The dominant culture did not encourage but rather undermined restraint. The dominant culture was transformed by a counter-culture. “At the heart of the counter-culture was a single-minded, often fanatical onslaught on boundaries and structures, a crusade to release Ariel, the infinite, expressive chaos into the everyday world” (Martin 1981, p. 15). Sexual pleasure and satisfaction, which had been traditionally affirmed only in marriage, became valorized in its own right through the Kinsey Reports (1948, 1953), the work of Masters and Johnson (1966, 1970, 1974, 1979, 1994), and such erotic best-sellers as *The Hite Report* (2003), leading to the emergence of genteel soft pornography and the contemporary cultural phenomena associated with an “easy” sexuality portrayed in the *Fifty Shades* trilogy (2012). All of this happened after the restraints of Western Christianity were foundationally weakened in the wake of the theological, cultural, and personal chaos that followed Vatican II (1962–1965), during which many Roman Catholic clerics left their call-

ing in order to marry or otherwise “find themselves” (Roman Catholicism’s contribution to the chaos in, and the transformation of, the dominant culture is addressed in chapter 7). Rather than to defend traditional sexual norms, many priests and nuns embraced the new spiritual and sexual *aggornamiento*, thus supporting the massive cultural changes that were under way. The changes in Roman Catholicism were reflected in similar transformations of mainline Christianity and liberal Judaism. Many religious institutions that could have effected restraint in fact were themselves caught up with and in fact abetted the turmoil and moral chaos^y. One thus finds the Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (EKD), which compasses Lutheran, Reformed, and United churches, endorsing a post-modern vision of the family that identifies sexual reproductive units of any sort, including traditional families, families from divorce and re-marriage, single-parent households, and same-sex couples (Root 2013; Kirchenamt der EKD 2013).

Martin notes how this counter-culture, along with its new sexual mores, was tied as well to the ethos associated with the culture of rock music, which at the same time was gaining cultural salience.

Rock music from its beginnings in the early 1950s was *par excellence* the cultural medium through which young people explored and expressed the symbolism of liminality (p. 154). Of all the features of social order which rock organizes, mediates and reflects, sexuality is probably the most important single element (Martin 1981, p. 183).

These profound alterations that occurred in the mores of the dominant culture of the West were the result of a complex constellation of factors, as Martin underscores.

The sexual revolution of the late twentieth century also has hard social foundations in the chemical technology of contraception, the medical provision for safe early abortion, and the control of venereal

y. The involvement of Christian clergy in the deconstruction of traditional Christian mores has been significant. One might think of recent examples of the contribution to this chaos made by Rt. Rev. John Shelby Spong, the Episcopal bishop of Newark, NJ (Spong 1988). In this genre, one would need also to place the work of the Episcopal minister and clinical pastoral care educator at New York Presbyterian Hospital, Columbia University, Raymond J. Lawrence, Jr. (Lawrence 1989 and 2007).

diseases. All these have radically altered the social and personal meanings of sexual behaviour. They make it possible for sexuality to be *reduced* to the expressive dimension, denuded of all attendant physiological, social, and moral consequences, and thus *of all risk*. Since the advent of the contraceptive pill and the medical capability of safe termination of pregnancy, human beings (significantly the female half of that plural) can separate sexuality from reproduction, and both from marriage, with greater ease than has ever before been the case (Martin 1981, p. 242).

The bottom line is that there were wide-ranging changes in norms bearing on sexuality, reproduction, and marriage, as well as in the general normative character of roles for men and women, fathers and mothers, husbands and wives. Because it is women who get pregnant, not men, much of this depended on changes regarding when women should agree to sexual intercourse, leading to an increase in the frequency of cohabitation and child-bearing outside of marriage, and to a change in the significance of marriage that has been reflected in rising divorce rates and births outside of marriage (Allen & Atkins 2012).

This dramatic recasting of sexual life-styles within the dominant secular culture has created numerous important points of conflict between the now-dominant secular culture and the normative sexual and reproductive life-styles of traditional Christians. Because traditional Christians live, experience, and know sexuality as properly nested within heterosexual marriage and tied to bringing children into the world, sexual activity and sexual self-fulfillment are affirmed, but only within marriage. This state of affairs not only underscores the traditional Christian moral affirmation of heterosexual marriage, but also condemns homosexual liaisons, along with heterosexual liaisons and reproduction outside of marriage. As a consequence, the traditional Christian ethos and ethics of sexuality and reproduction are saliently politically incorrect and against the grain of the times. In traditional Christian communities, sexual mores are as a result radically different from what oc-

curs in the dominant secular culture. In traditional Christian communities, men tend to be schooled in sexual responsibility by women who explain to men that they can get access to sexual satisfaction only through marriage. Traditional Christian women defend cultural constraints that focus men on remaining faithful to one woman and on committing men to earning enough to support a wife and children, because among other things it is in their self-interest. In traditional cultures, both men and women are schooled in moral habits that look beyond the affluence of a consumerist society and that instead focus on a commitment to each other and to God that supports heterosexual marital unions. The traditional focus is on men and women's intertwining obligations, but not on equality. Again, the traditional Christian moral vision rather than underscoring the liberation of women regards women as the protectresses of the morality of a culture in controlling access to sexual satisfaction. In a traditional Christian culture, it is recognized that if women provide sex before marriage, women diminish the incentives of men to marry, and they also undermine the likelihood of women finding an acceptable partner willing to marry (again, as the traditional adage puts the matter, "if you give the milk away free, why should he buy the cow?"). Mothers will tell their sons to act like a man, embracing the special virtues of self-possession, courage, self-sacrifice, self-control, and responsibility required in order to be a good husband, a good father, and the breadwinner for a large family with a stay-at-home wife. Traditional Christians will regard the sexual liberation movement for women as in fact having become a means for the sexual exploitation of women by men. The governing ideals of traditional Christian men and women are not contained within the horizon of the finite and the immanent.

Within this new life-world of sexuality and reproductive sustained by the dominant secular culture, the deportment of traditional Christian physicians will not only appear puzzling but as highly immoral in recognizing the dominant secular culture's demoralization of consensual sexual and reproductive choices. Imagine a traditional Christian physician who posts on his web-

site and in his waiting room a statement (in addition personally to informing all new patients) that he will not provide contraception for unmarried women nor refer for abortion. Secular bioethics can but recognize such ethics as unethical. Because sexual and reproductive choices are reduced to life-style choices set within a particular vision of human flourishing, it becomes a violation of secular bioethics for physicians, nurses, and other healthcare professionals to express adverse judgments regarding the insemination of lesbians, the use of donor gametes in reproduction within marriage, the use of transsexual surgery, and abortion. It becomes a violation of secular bioethics to fail to provide these services or even refer for them, a point to which we will turn in particular in chapter five.

In contrast, within the dominant secular culture the ethos of sexual and reproductive responsibility has been transformed men within a post-traditional culture can eschew marriage and reproduction. If they do find themselves the father of a child, and the woman will not “do the right thing and abort,” the men, if they are in the lower socio-economic classes and are therefore judgment-proof, can easily avoid responsibility by never working sufficiently to be obliged to pay child support. Thus, a man can reproduce with more than one woman, usually finding some lonely woman to accept him. A new life-world of sexuality has taken shape in which women can be more easily exploited. Men are now at liberty to have sex with multiple women and not to get married. They need only ‘respect’ the women with whom they have sex by affirming their personal self-fulfillment, all the while trying to avoid enduring commitments, especially any commitment to marriage. This strategy helps satisfy male sexual interest without reinforcing any notion of enduring responsibility on the part of men to the women with whom they have intercourse. The life-worlds of traditional Christianity and of the now-dominant culture collide. They involve

incompatible views of the status and obligations of men and women regarding sexuality, reproduction, equality in the workplace, marriage, children, and the family.

For women who wish finally to marry and have children, the playing field between men and women has become even more unequal. In the secular culture, women are encouraged to delay marriage and children in order to enter the workplace, while nevertheless being sexually active. Men can do the same, but they can outlast the women. A woman who delays marriage until after 35 will be neither as attractive as a marriage partner nor as fertile as she was in her twenties. On the other hand, a man in his late thirties or early forties when his career is established will look quite attractive to a woman in her twenties. As a consequence, the deferral of marriage by women in order to enter the workforce and to find sexual fulfillment equally with men appears to traditional cultures as a failure to appreciate two of the stark inequalities of men and women: women live longer than men, while their reproductive life is shorter than that of men. Men can marry and raise a large family, starting even in their sixties, while women cannot^z. Men and women are not equal^{aa}. This, among other things, has increased the demand for third-party-assisted reproduction and shaped the character of contemporary secular bioethics.

In closing this section, it is important to note not only how opaque the future is, but even how opaque the present is. Immense changes are occurring in how men and women engage the world within the contemporary secular culture. Post-industrial societies have a decreasing percentage of jobs for which the physical prowess that characterizes men is useful. It is a world in which verbal expression is becoming much more important than physical strength. The implications are significant and complex. They are associated, for example, with more women than men completing higher education (OECD 2011). Many men are having difficulty in

z. For a recent study of the financial consequences of marrying early or late, see Hymowitz et al. 2013.

aa. Regarding the inequality of men and women, Kay Hymowitz remarks: “As women move into their thirties and forties, they remain less enticing to younger men than men of that age are to younger women. Men who at 23 may have felt like the class dork find their stride by 30. Women are on the opposite trajectory. Sexism? Evolution? It doesn't really matter; it's not going away” (Hymowitz 2011, p. 19).

adapting to the new environment. Some attribute the difficulty at least in part to a failure in male maturation (Hymowitz 2011)^{bb}. As Hanna Rosin has observed in *The End of Men and the Rise of Women*, “Boys of every race and background have a much higher incidence of school disciplinary and behavior problems and suspensions, and they spend far fewer hours doing homework” (Rosin 2012, p. 163). These changes have also interestingly been associated with some decrease in sexual promiscuity. “In 1988, half of boys aged fifteen to seventeen reported having sex; by 2010 that number fell to just under a third. For teenage girls, the numbers dropped from 37.2 to 27 percent” (Rosin 2012, p. 19). What this all means is far from clear and it surely does not mean the same thing for all communities within a society (Murray 2012). Hasidic Jews, for example, appear to be surviving relatively unscathed within a very secular New York City (Fader 2009). On the other hand, young Japanese appear to be losing interest in sex (Haworth 2013).

Also at stake in all that has happened is a contrast between radically different understandings of the family. On the one hand, there remains a traditional, ontological, or metaphysical recognition of the family as a social possibility that should be realized by actual families, and that brings with it predetermined roles for husbands

and wives, as well as fathers, mothers, and children. This appreciation of the family encompasses previous generations and looks forward to the generations that are to come. Such families possess an integrity and autonomy of their own, amassing both social and financial capital, so as to give care and support to previous as well as following generations. Such families embrace a commitment to having children, as well as to caring morally and financially for them. Such views of the family are affirmed by traditional Christianity and Judaism (Fader 2009), as well as by Confucianism within important implications for bioethics and healthcare policy (Fan 1997; Fan 2010; Fan 2011). In contrast, there is a libertarian/liberal view of the family, which construes the family as rising out of the agreement of its constituent members, as well as being shaped by commitments to the liberty, equality, and the self-satisfaction of its members. Roles within the family reflect no pre-existing reality by choice and social forces. Such socio-sexual units have no necessary commitment to producing children. After all, children can be major impediments to self-satisfaction. Finally, reality appears to impose constraints: children in “families” other than those constituted from the marriage of their father and mother appear to be subject to significant risks.

bb. Kay Hymowitz, for example, remarks concerning contemporary men: “Between his lack of familial responsibilities, his relative affluence, and an entertainment media devoted to his every pleasure, the single young man can live in pig’s heaven” (Hymowitz 2011, p. 19).

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